Friday, April 25, 2008

News 2 May: Russia's Second Oil Peak

First, a quick Admin note. I have slightly reworked DR's very first article. I am working on the third Demographics post. After that, I will make downloadable .pdf versions of the article available in both English and Russian. Then it will be time for a new post, 10 Russophile Predictions (with a challenge to Russophobes to provide an equivalent) and the uploading/plugging of my own site (not exclusively Russia-related). With that said, let's move on to the News.





For all the noise being made this month about Georgia, about NATO, about Tibet, etc, possibly the most portentous is that it seems Russia hit its oil peak (strictly speaking, its second - the first happened in 1987), well in line with peakist predictions. Production increases via application of new technology, as seen in the late 90's and early 2000's have been mostly exhausted; there are no megaprojects to bridge the gap beyond 2010. (There has been some noise about new oil field discoveries off Brazil's coast which could contain as many as 33bn barrels, which has our dear Economist rejoicing: "the discoveries do suggest that the gloomiest pundits are wrong to predict that the world will soon run out of oil". Just two problems. The issue is not about the world running our of oil - it's about economically damaging declines in production which will, and are, hitting crucial sectors like transport and agriculture. Secondly, and more to the point, even the high estimate of 33bn barrels is enough for less than half a year of today's demand of 85bn barrels.) Massive expansion in Russia has been the main reason while oil is peaking now, rather than five years ago. This, coupled with stagnant Saudi Arabia 'refusing' to increase oil production so as to leave more for future generations and oil prices rising to 120$, looks set to vindicate the Oil Drum predictions below.


The phenomenom of peak oil is starting to become a new conventional wisdom. Krugman penned an excellent article on this, an interesting example of mainstream economists and "doomers" getting wedded:

Nine years ago The Economist ran a big story on oil, which was then selling for $10 a barrel. The magazine warned that this might not last. Instead, it suggested, oil might well fall to $5 a barrel.

In any case, The Economist asserted, the world faced “the prospect of cheap, plentiful oil for the foreseeable future.”

Last week, oil hit $117.

It’s not just oil that has defied the complacency of a few years back. Food prices have also soared, as have the prices of basic metals. And the global surge in commodity prices is reviving a question we haven’t heard much since the 1970s: Will limited supplies of natural resources pose an obstacle to future world economic growth?

How you answer this question depends largely on what you believe is driving the rise in resource prices. Broadly speaking, there are three competing views.

The first is that it’s mainly speculation — that investors, looking for high returns at a time of low interest rates, have piled into commodity futures, driving up prices. On this view, someday soon the bubble will burst and high resource prices will go the way of Pets.com.

The second view is that soaring resource prices do, in fact, have a basis in fundamentals — especially rapidly growing demand from newly meat-eating, car-driving Chinese — but that given time we’ll drill more wells, plant more acres, and increased supply will push prices right back down again.

The third view is that the era of cheap resources is over for good — that we’re running out of oil, running out of land to expand food production and generally running out of planet to exploit. I find myself somewhere between the second and third views.

There are some very smart people — not least, George Soros — who believe that we’re in a commodities bubble (although Mr. Soros says that the bubble is still in its “growth phase”). My problem with this view, however, is this: Where are the inventories?

Normally, speculation drives up commodity prices by promoting hoarding. Yet there’s no sign of resource hoarding in the data: inventories of food and metals are at or near historic lows, while oil inventories are only normal.

The best argument for the second view, that the resource crunch is real but temporary, is the strong resemblance between what we’re seeing now and the resource crisis of the 1970s.

What Americans mostly remember about the 1970s are soaring oil prices and lines at gas stations. But there was also a severe global food crisis, which caused a lot of pain at the supermarket checkout line — I remember 1974 as the year of Hamburger Helper — and, much more important, helped cause devastating famines in poorer countries.

In retrospect, the commodity boom of 1972-75 was probably the result of rapid world economic growth that outpaced supplies, combined with the effects of bad weather and Middle Eastern conflict. Eventually, the bad luck came to an end, new land was placed under cultivation, new sources of oil were found in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, and resources got cheap again.

But this time may be different: concerns about what happens when an ever-growing world economy pushes up against the limits of a finite planet ring truer now than they did in the 1970s.

For one thing, I don’t expect growth in China to slow sharply anytime soon. That’s a big contrast with what happened in the 1970s, when growth in Japan and Europe, the emerging economies of the time, downshifted — and thereby took a lot of pressure off the world’s resources.

Meanwhile, resources are getting harder to find. Big oil discoveries, in particular, have become few and far between, and in the last few years oil production from new sources has been barely enough to offset declining production from established sources.

And the bad weather hitting agricultural production this time is starting to look more fundamental and permanent than El Niño and La Niña, which disrupted crops 35 years ago. Australia, in particular, is now in the 10th year of a drought that looks more and more like a long-term manifestation of climate change.

Suppose that we really are running up against global limits. What does
it mean?

Even if it turns out that we’re really at or near peak world oil production, that doesn’t mean that one day we’ll say, “Oh my God! We just ran out of oil!” and watch civilization collapse into “Mad Max” anarchy.

But rich countries will face steady pressure on their economies from rising resource prices, making it harder to raise their standard of living. And some poor countries will find themselves living dangerously close to the edge — or over it.

Don’t look now, but the good times may have just stopped rolling.

No wonder survivalism is becoming respectable again.

(Not that I think the world is going to become a Mad Max abode; there's still plenty of discretionary energy consumption that can be cut, and in the longer term future both wind and solar energy have very good prospects. Nonetheless, according to this study, "Exergy services can be equated to exergy inputs multiplied by an overall conversion efficiency. which, of course, corresponds to cumulative technological improvements over time. Based on this hypothesis economic growth from 1900 to 1975 or so is explained almost perfectly, exceptfor wartime perturbations." Hence I suspect there will be a period of serious economic disruption in the period between 2010-20, when oil and natural gas spiral down and both coal and uranium will be hard pressed to fill the gap (economically viable reserves may well be close to peak, as described here (coal) and here (uranium), and 2030-50, when renewable energy starts to come on-line in a really big way.)

Not surprisingly, two key trends - rising energy prices and climate change - are colluding to produce a scramble for the Arctic and its lucrative hydrocarbons deposits. Russia has foresightedly been marking territory by staking claims in the UN, planting its flag at the North Pole sea floor and carrying out strategic bomber flights over the Arctic. Canada, Denmark and Norway have also been getting on in the action, while the US has been lethargic. Climate models indicate an ice-free summer by 2015, meaning northern Russia will become a major new transportation hub between Europe and East Asia (thus making the old dream of a North-East passage a reality).

While wildlife wilts, agriculture booms - "Greenland is experiencing a farming boom, as once-barren soil now yields broccoli, hay, and potatoes", and Russia keeps getting warmer. (What with rising world grain prices and the big lands left fallow following the Soviet collapse, it is easy for Russia to cement its status as a leading grain producer (from 81mn tonnes in 2007 to 110-120mn tonnes within a decade) by expanding the agricultural sector, a trend explained in The Medvedev Economy and confirmed by state investment into agriculture.) Not only will Russia remain a major hydrocarbons exporter, but will add cereals to its portfolio (which will, besides, increase in price), thus avoiding the fatal Soviet situation where profits from oil exports were eaten up by having to buy Western grains.

But returning to the FP Arctic Meltdown article and hydrocarbons,

The largest deposits are found in the Arctic off the coast of Russia. The Russian state-controlled oil company Gazprom has approximately 113 trillion cubic feet of gas already under development in the fields it owns in the Barents Sea. The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources calculates that the territory claimed by Moscow could contain as much as 586 billion barrels of oil -- although these deposits are unproven. By comparison, all of Saudi Arabia's current proven oil reserves -- which admittedly exclude unexplored and speculative resources -- amount to only 260 billion barrels.
Currently, Russia has passed its second oil peak. Could the above make for a third peak? Discovery precedes recovery by around 30 years. 586bn barrels is about twice bigger than oil reserves in Russia proper before extraction ever began. Without ice, the extractive environment in the Arctic will be comparable to that of the North Sea. As such, it is plausible that Russia may even, around 2020-30, experience a third oil peak, at a time when global supply is severely constrained and prices are at 300-400 $ per barrel. What with its current (relatively low) consumption, this means that Russia may be spared from the energy crunch that will hit other energy-dependent economies in this time period.

Perhaps most significant will be the geopolitical impacts (which, btw, we have covered in Towards a New Russian Century?). Russia is going to have to fundamentally rethink its traditional conceptions of itself as a land power, strategically weak and surrounded by predatory peoples who periodically exhaust the carrying capacity of their lands and launch invasions. It is going to become surrounded by ice-free water on two sides, along whose coasts will accumulate a rapidly expanding population (especially if environmental collapse causes mass immigration from South Asia, the Middle East and the Far East). This, along with a much greater stake in coastal transportation and off-shore hydrocarbons deposits, will require a much more powerful navy. No wonder Russia has tentative plans to create the world's second largest surface navy within the next two decades, to which purpose a 410x100x14m drydock is currently under construction at Severodvinsk.

The IMF has released its prognosis for the world economy. A slowdown is inevitable, driven by a US correction due to a housing crisis and its contagion of the world financial system.

Global growth will decelerate in 2008, led by a sharp slowdown in the United States, amid a housing correction and a financial crisis that has quickly spread from the U.S. subprime sector to core parts of the financial system, the IMF says in its latest World Economic Outlook.

Citing the unfolding financial market turmoil as the biggest downside risk to the global economy, the April 2008 report said the IMF expects world growth to slow to 3.7 percent in 2008—0.5 percentage point lower than what was forecast in the January 2008 World Economic Outlook Update.

Further, world growth would achieve little pickup in 2009, and there is a 25 percent chance that the global economy will record 3 percent or less growth in 2008 and 2009, equivalent to a global recession.
The main emerging market economies will diverge rather than decouple, with growth in China, India, Russia and CEE slowing but not catastrophically so, remaining close to their long-term trend rates.


However, the government is even more optimistic, projecting 7.6% growth for 2008. Considering that Q1 GDP growth was 8.0%, driven as in the year before by consumption and investment, they have grounds for their optimism. On the other hand, CPI (inflation) is rising worrying fast, reaching an annualized rate of 13.3% this March, although it should be noted this is a worldwide phenomenom experienced by China (8.3%), India (8.6%), Czech Republic (7.1%) and Latvia (16.8%).

The Ukraine (26%+) has been hit not only by high food and energy prices, but populist government largesse. (To take their minds off these matters, perhaps that's why Hitler action dolls have gone on sale there, more proof if any is needed of the proclivities to fascism of certain sections of Ukrainian society. Gazprom will probably end 2008 as the company with the world's second highest revenue (around 41.5bn $), similar to the budget of an economic basket case, say, Ukraine (43bn $). (Can't help making these cheap shots, just ignore them if they irritate you).

The IMF has also released new estimates for GDP growth through to 2013. By the end of that period, Russia's PPP GDP should overtake Latvia's and be level-pegging with Poland's. The rise in nominal GDP is projected to be more dramatic (graph lifted off this thread):


The Economist has an interesting graph breaking down GDP increase for major regions in the world by capital, labor and total factor productivity (GDP itself can be expressed as a Cobb-Douglas function of the above 3 components) from a WB report, Unleashing Prosperity.

It is a splendid vindication of the ideas I expressed in Education as the Elixir of Growth. There, I made the argument that the education/'Human Capital Index' (HCI) of each country is matched to a 'potential GDP level'; where there is a large gap between potential and actual GDP, economic growth is highest. This above all explains the impressive economic growth we're seeing in well-educated but relatively poor countries like Russia (once it abandoned its socialist shackles), and explains well the unimpressive growth of countries like Brazil, an badly-educated country with a correspondingly unimpressive economy.


However, the linkages between HCI and productivity are even higher than between HCI and GDP (as GDP also depends on labor and capital inputs, which themselves depend on other demographic and social factors). From the chart, we can see that middle-income CIS countries (of whom Russia is, by far, the largest and most significant) had the largest increases in TFP, thus reflecting the huge gaps in its potential and actual productivity. While China's absolute growth was much larger, almost half of it was down due to increases in labor and capital. However, considering China's recent labor shortages and its unsustainably high investment rates, it is very unlikely that double-digit growth will continue in the near-to-medium future, particularly further taking into account that a) exports will be hit by US recession and b) from 2009 onwards the oil peak will start biting ever harder (as covered above). Latin American countries were the worst performers, seeing no improvement in TFP - in other words, they are about as productive as their levels of human capital allow them to be (without a resource windfall or two).

In a snapshot of other economic and related news, the housing bust has spread to the UK. Haiti's government collapses after food riots - an ominous foreboding of things to come elsewhere? Between 2000 and 2007, median family incomes stagnated in the US, in stark contrast to the period between every other recession (the fact that the 2000's saw a broad consumer boom becomes all the more worrying). The falling dollar has made US assets attractive, and Russia has accumulated around 10% of US steelmaking capacity - although it has not limited itself to the US, but also went on a shopping spree around Germany. Russia may allow the ruble to appreciate to rein in inflation. Moscow's budget is now as big as New York's. Confidence in the economy is increasing. According to the FT, Moscow could become Europe's second financial center (after London) in ten to fifteen years. The Russian 'brain drain' has to a large extent ceased as funding and salaries increase in academia.





On 21st April, Georgia accused Russia of an “unprovoked act of aggression” after a Russian jet allegedly shot down an unmanned Georgian reconnaissance plane over Abkhazia. This came in the wake of Russia stepping up its political representation in the region, while Georgia implicitly compared Western policy towards Russia with Nazi appeasement. Meanwhile Putin urged the West not to 'demonise' Russia. (The IHT has a piece that critisizes US aloof arrogance in its relations with Russia in The Missing Debate.)

Watch the cool video below, it's now every day that you get to see a MiG-29 fire an R-60 missile at CBDR, within visual range and head on.


Presumably Russia wishes to make a statement that it is ready and willing to defend Russian citizens (i.e. the vast majority of Abkhazians, and South Ossetians). It is also Russia's traditional foreign policy level over Georgia - it's separatist enclaves - being exploited. When Georgia pursued a relatively neutralist line towards Russia (under Shevardnadze), Russia kept at arms length from the separatists, but established a military presence in the region. Now that Georgia has received a promise of eventual membership from NATO, however, the levers have been pulled. If Georgia received MAP at the next summit, expect formal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
A German man is on trial in Germany for allegedly selling military technology to Russian intelligence. Good to see our spooks hard at work, as always. Speaking of which, the traitor Gordievsky complains of being poisoned. The Russian Army apparently has some serious problems with obesity. Greece agrees to host a section of Gazprom's planned South Stream pipeline. Berlusconi held his first foreign meeting with Putin on 17th April, and Robert Amsterdam penned an acerbic yet interesting portrait of the similarities between the two countries.
The most recent data on Russian and American strategic nuclear armaments, as declared for the START Treaty, is available here. In contrast to the late Soviet period, it is now the US that has a preponderance of platforms. The breakdowns in deployed systems, Russian and US respectively, go as follows: ICBM's (481 to 550); SLBM's (288 to 432); heavy bombers (79 to 243); total (848 to 1225). The breakdown by numbers of deployed warheads is: ICBM's (2027 to 1600), SLBM's (1488 to 3216); heavy bombers (632 to 1098); total (4147 to 5914). The breakdown by throw-weight for ICBM's and SLBM's is 2370MT to 1830MT. In other words, while Russia has a slightly larger overall megatonnage, it has fewer strategic platforms and its missiles are less accurate. This is not yet a critical situation, what with the current international relations paradigm; nonetheless, further investments are necessary, particularly into the submarine and bomber part of the triad as well as ABM, in anticipation of the end of MAD due to the development of effective and comprehensive missile shields - which are closer to fruition, at least in the US, than most people realize. Perhaps I'll write more on this in the future.
An interesting article from the Times on WMD developments in Syria and North Korea.
Foreign Affairs has The Age of Nonpolarity as its kindpin article for May/June.
Summary: The United States' unipolar moment is over. International relations in the twenty-first century will be defined by nonpolarity. Power will be diffuse rather than concentrated, and the influence of nation-states will decline as that of nonstate actors increases. But this is not all bad news for the United States; Washington can still manage the transition and make the world a safer place.
...
Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places...Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.
...
Getting everyone to agree on everything will be increasingly difficult; instead, the United States should consider signing accords with fewer parties and narrower goals. Trade is something of a model here, in that bilateral and regional accords are filling the vacuum created by a failure to conclude a global trade round. The same approach could work for climate change, where agreement on aspects of the problem (say, deforestation) or arrangements involving only some countries (the major carbon emitters, for example) may prove feasible, whereas an accord that involves every country and tries to resolve every issue may not. Multilateralism à la carte is likely to be the order of the day.
I agree that the US is in relative decline and about the rise of multilateral pragmatism in diplomacy. Nonetheless, I question the thesis that state power is eroding. The state remains as strong as ever, and far stronger than their equivalents a hundred years ago. Several European nations take in more than 50% of their GDP in taxes. This rate in the distant past was only reached during times of total war, e.g. WW2. States are most certainly not "challenged" by either global organizations (which are simply assemblies of states where they can seek concensus), militias (which have always existed) or NGO's (which operate under statal jurisdictions).

Putin has become leader of United Russia, in addition to being the Prime Minister. Sean's Russia Blog already has an excellent analysis in Gensek Putin (which also features a nice little demographics discussion in which my posts on the matter were mentioned).
That of course raises the issue of whether a nothing party like United Russia will actually give Putin something. As Konstantin Sonin noted in the Moscow Times, leading United Russia wouldn’t necessarily give Putin any guarantee over controlling the government. “The party has nothing to offer Putin in his struggle for power,” says Sonin...
...
The chairman position gives Putin virtually unlimited power within UR. Putin will have the power to appoint party leaders and suspend their powers, and override any party decision expect for those adopted at congresses. His removal is only possible with a 2/3 congressional vote.

If Putin can be taken at his word, he has plans for United Russia. In his address to the Congress he stated that the party of Power needed to “reform itself become more open for discussion and for taking into account the opinion of the electorate, it must be de-bureaucratized completely, cleared of casual people pursuing exclusively their own material gains.” Look out, there’s a new sheriff in town.
Plans have already been set in motion for the recognition of internal factions. Three “clubs” have been created within United Russia to represent its right, center, and left. There is the Center of Social Conservative Policy, headed by Andrei Isaev, the liberal-conservative “November 4th” club led by Vladimir Pligin, and the State-patriotic club led by Irina Yarovaya. Whether these clubs will actually mean anything in terms of inter-party dialog remains to be seen.

Putin’s chief task, if he chooses to take it, will be to rid the party of what he calls “corrupt people.” A task easier said than done. Historically, attempts to clean up party corruption have horribly failed. Often the anti-bureaucratic campaigns, purges, and even arrests within the Communist Party created more corruption. And like the Communist Party of the past, United Russia seems allergic to any real cracking down on its corrupt members. Last week, the United Russia dominated Duma rejected a bill which would require deputies to declare the incomes and property of their relatives up to three years after leaving office. Hiding wealth and property in the names of family members is a common, albeit crude way, of hiding corruption.

Basically, if Putin actually decides to lead United Russia, he’s going to have his hands full. Just because he is the almighty Putin doesn’t mean he will be successful.
Michael Averko has an excellent article in American Chronicle, Ukraine and "Russophobia" Uncensored, which covers more on the Annals of Western Hypocrisy (which goes on and on, World and Time without End). I've quoted the first three paragraphs:
Since the Soviet breakup, Ukraine has been geo-politically spun in two ways. When Ukraine's less Russia friendly side appears to have enhanced its stature, there is an increased yearning to drive Ukraine away from Russia as much as possible. When Ukraine's more Russia friendly grouping seems strengthened, there is greater talk of mutual respect for the two Ukrainian ways of viewing Russia. Another Ukrainian perspective falls somewhere in between the two.
On NATO expansion, "the will of the people", takes a back seat for the Russia unfriendly crowd. The Orange Ukrainian government's desire to have Ukraine in NATO has consistently run contrary to the majority of its citizenry. The explanations for this unpopularity include a not so well informed Ukrainian public, caught in a Cold War time warp.
In comparison, there is little second guessing of polls showing that most Ukrainian citizens have a positive attitude on their country joining the European Union (EU). For some, Ukrainians are ignorant when stating apprehension about NATO and knowledgeable upon agreeing with the anti-Russian consensus; albeit for not always the same reason.
Sean's Russia Blog has comprehensive coverage of the Putin / Kabaeva rumors. Also a story about the hobbies of Russia's nanotechnologists, e.g. building marchhead-sized chess sets.
Demographic stats from Rosstat have come out for Jan/Feb 2008. While the birth rate increased by 11.3%, so did the death rate by 2.6%, reaching 15.8 / 1000 from 15.4 / 1000 in 2007. Seems that January was not an anomaly - the rapid improvements seen since 2005 have petered out, at least temporarily. But this is not totally unexpected, however. As I noted in my demographics posts, there is a very close correlation between mortality and the alcohol/food price ratio. Overall inflation in Jan-Feb was 3.5%, food price inflation was 3.6%; but the price of alcohol increased by 1.9%. The alcohol/food price ratio has fallen further, perhaps to its lowest ever historical level. In other demographic news, in 2006 there were 1.6mn abortions in Russia, hugely down from the 1990's but still 2 to 3 times higher per capita than in the West.
Finally a few public opinion polls. In February 2008, PEW released figures that showed 63% of Russians preferred a strong leader over democracy, down from 70% and 21% respectively in 2002, but a lot higher than in 1991, when a majority (51%) favored a democracy over a strong leader (39%). 74% would rather have a strong economy, while only 15% would like a good democracy. Ukraine, Bulgaria and even Poland show similar figures. In another rather interesting result, half of Russians agreed with the statement that 'most people in society are trustworthy', which is higher than the average for Eastern Europe and about average for Western Europe.

59% of Russians (almost certainly correctly) say there is no life on Mars, while 26% disagree. 49% of them believe that there'll be a human on Mars and 59% think there'll be a lunar base within the next 50 years. (Russia, like the US and China, has tentative plans for both enterprises). A new 'Space Competitiveness Index' (whatever that means) has been compiled, in which Russia takes third place behind the US and Europe. China is fourth.

Saturday, April 19, 2008

Editorial: We need a Fat Tax

Further to the discussion on mortality demographics, I present my arguments for why all countries that care about the health of their people should introduce a fat tax.

In my previous topic on these matters, You Live How You Eat, we noticed that culinary cultures which consume a low-fat diet have tend to have dramatically lower mortality rates from CVD's and degenerative diseases than those who indulge in a high-fat, high-sodium 'civilized' diet. As such it is a good idea to encourage consumption to shift from high-fat to low-fat foods.

How will the fat tax work?

Research should be conducted so as to ascertain the optimal levels of taxation to maximize positive outcomes, and the tax will probably be introduced gradually. But I'll give a rough idea of how the tax will work below.

Calculate the caloric fat content of a particular food (take the number of grams of fat per 100g and multiply by 9; divide this by calories per 100g to get %). Anything under 20% will remain untaxed. This includes vegetables, fruits, fish and some white meats (skinless chicken breast). Then a flat tax of 25% for 20-30% fat (this will account for leaner steaks), 100% for 30-50% fat (traditional red meats) and 200% for 50+% fat (fast food hamburgers, vegetable oils, etc).
Sodium will be taxed too. The RDA for sodium is 2g, or 4g of salt (max 3g/6g). Say, anything with more than 0.5g of sodium / 100g will be flat taxed at 50%.

A few foods, while OK in fat, are unacceptably high in cholesterol. The big one are eggs - one egg yolk = 2 days of RDA of cholesterol. Tax them at 200%. While some seafoods like prawns or oysters are medium-high in cholesterol, they have other health benefits, so leave them untaxed. I will not tax sugar because a) cakes, puddings, etc will already be taxed for their fat content and b) a lot of fruit actually contain a rather high % of sugar, but it is of a healthy kind. Fruit shouldn't be taxed.

Why don't you just stick with public information campaigns?

It is of course vital to propagandize the benefits for personal health of a low-fat diet on prime-time TV, radio, Internet and other media outlets. It goes without saying that advertising unhealthy foods will be a no-no, along with alcoholic drinks and tobacco. On the other hand, people do respond to price signals and meat and sweets costing less than fruit does not make a good contribution to public health. The fact is that countries with some specific diets (e.g. Okinawans have a life expectancy of 85 years) have health results that are objectively better than countries with other diets (e.g. Americans, Danes have a life expectancy of 77-78 years). So surely it would make sense to tax and subsidize in a way that shifts consumption patterns to the ones seen in countries/regions with the better health results?

Sounds radical! People won't stand for it!

Radical problems (a million preventable deaths from heart disease per year in the US alone, etc) require radical solutions. The hoi polloi will be treated to an intense national information campaign informing them of the benefits of the low fat diet. Critics will suffer accidents. (j/k)

Seriously though. The elite has a vested interest in improving the health of the workforce. Firstly, there will appear articles in newspapers and programs on TV exploring the links between nutrition and health. Advocacy groups for healthy dieting will appear and momentum for legislative changes will build up. Eventually, the government will bow to the public interest and gradually step up the fat tax.

It will hurt the agricultural sector and the food industry!

In industrialized countries, agriculture tends to account for a low % of GDP (7.9% in Portugal, 4.6% in Russia, 2.0% in France, o.9% in the US), and accounts for a correspondingly low % of those countries' workforces (10.0% in Portugal, 10.8% in Russia, 4.1% in France, 0.4% in the US). So a dip in these figures will not affect the national economy much. In any case producers can adjust to it if plenty of advance warning is given and changes are introduced gradually.

Same goes for the food industry. The demand for food will remain; they will just have to try to adjust to the new order of things. Maybe it will be too hard for companies like McDonalds or KFC, but who cares about them anyway?

Is it ethical to force me to pay for eating what I want to?

Well, for some products you can pay very dearly indeed for consuming them (e.g. illegal drugs), i.e. with jail time. Secondly, according to this fat tax policy paper, in France and some US states unhealthy snack foods like chips and soft drinks are already subject to taxes.

Incidentally, however, I have always supported legalizing all drugs, for the usual health, monetary and battling hypocrisy reasons, although they would remain heavily taxed (except red wine and to a lesser extent white wine, the consumption of which will be encouraged in moderate daily doses). On the topic of which, fat is actually also a drug - it is both debilitating and makes you irritable and mentally sluggish if consumed to excess in one session.

Finally, consumption of high fat foods will not, of course, be banned outright. You can still stuff yourself with butter and high-fat cheese if you really want to, you'll just have to pay more for it.

How will it change consumption patterns?

Today, there is an illogical situation in which rich cakes sometimes cost substantially less than an equivalent weight in fruit or salad, in supermarkets or in catering. The fat tax will reverse this state of affairs by encouraging people to switch consumption patterns to a lower fat, healthier diet. After all, elasticity is high within foods.

Currently, even people who would otherwise want to eat healthily are discouraged from doing so because of higher prices because this is a niche market squeezed by the mainstream food market which is high in fat and sodium.

But it's regressive, you capitalist scum!

Yes, it will affect the poor more than the rich. However, consider also the fact that it is the poor who suffer most from low-quality diets and the attendant symptons of obesity, heart disease, etc. Money from the fat tax can be used to support subsidies to healthy foods, community sports programs and a system of preventative healthcare, all of which are sorely lacking in Russia and the industrialized West.

A fat tax is a profoundly pro-poor measure.

It's not radical enough!

I have considered converting the food industry into a totally planned thing, on the Soviet model but focused on the goal of fat reduction. Inefficiencies will invariably develop; but since food production a) constitutes a fairly small portion of GDP, b) the goals of what to increase, what prices to set, are quite clear and c) there aren't many food products (relative to advanced industrial goods), it is a sound proposal.

Nonetheless, I think the market-based solution (fat tax, but free setting of prices) should first be completely explored and the planned model considered only if the former fails in its objectives (say, reduce by 50%+ annual cases of heart disease mortality, etc, over a decade since its full implementation).

You're a crazed totalitarian bastard!

Yes, I am. Next.

OK, its good for healthcare, longevity and mortality statistics, etc. But its not an enjoyable diet.

Wrong. I can vouch for that personally.

I have cut out all butter, margarine, vegetable oils (switching to things like balsamic vinegar, salsa and low fat, low sodium tomato sauce and bolognese); cut out jams with any added sugars (there are some preserved with fruit concentrate, which I think is OK); only consume skimmed milk, low-fat cheese; no chocolate or coffee; a glass of red wine per day; only do skinless chicken breast or fish; cut out egg yolks. Of course, I don't always follow it, but the only exceptions are in social settings where I go to a party or gathering, etc. As long as interruptions are infrequent rather than systematic, all is good.

Chicken and fish can be greatly enhanced by tossing in lemon, peppers, all kinds of spices, etc, and served with rice, pasta, etc. Consult this article for a list of healthy recipes. For instance, you can even make a delicious carrot cake (calories 159, cholesterol 0, fat 0.6g, calories from fat 3%).

The point is that a low fat diet is only a little bit more restrictive than an unrestricted fat diet, if you bother to find/adapt the appropriate recipes, and it is orders of magnitude better for health/wellbeing.

I don't want strict, state controlled food provisions just for a few more years of life expectancy? Just let me be!

The key point is not increased longevity, which due to the high standards of treatment-based modern medical care, is not going to be much more than 5 years or so. The key point is a much increased healthy life expectancy.


Note how in the UK life expectancy has increased much more rapidly than healthy life expectancy. The main trend in this period? More consumption of fats, especially saturated, in the forms of fast food, which has increased obesity levels significantly over this period.

So the question isn't whether you'd like a few more years or not, but whether or not you want to spend the last few years of your life incapacitated and hooked up to mediciny machines.

At least so far. If medical progress continues and radical life extension therapies become available by the middle of this century, those few added years could make the difference between death and immortality!

What else would you do?

As I said here, I would expend efforts on eliminating Russia's alcohol epidemic, try to encourage a shift from spirits to red wine and offer monetary benefits to obese people making an effort to slim down. I would relax controls on gun sales because I think an armed citizenry leads to lower crime rates. I would try to think of some way to encourage calorie restriction amongst the population, but I doubt I'll succeed.

Too many people both in Russia and in the West pursue sedentary lifestyles. As such, massive state resources will be limited to developing a culture of sport in the population, including but not limited to: advertising, funding and subsidies for sports centers and the people who use them. The Armed Forces can play an important role in this. To cover the whole population, the terms of conscription can be dropped further from 1 year to 6 months (as in Germany), but extended to women (as in Israel), so that the overall size will remain the same.

Monday, April 14, 2008

Editorial: Demographics II - Out of the Death Spiral

As we covered in the previous instalment, Demographics I: The Russian Cross Reversed?, fertility rates are not abnormally low by European standards and are likely to rise further in the future. The same cannot be said of mortality rates - a 'quiet crisis' that has been a 'catastrophe of historic proportions'.

Take life expectancy. As of 2007, the average age of death in Russia was 65.9 years. This is way below First World levels (United States - 78.0; EU - 78.7; Japan - 82.0) and even many developing country standards (Mexico - 75.6; China - 72.9; Egypt - 71.6; India - 68.6). Note: this figure was actually 67.7 years in 2007 (the CIA relies on its own projections to estimate demographic data), but the general point stands.

Even compared to other post-Soviet countries, Russia's mortality stats are far from impressive - as you can see from the graphs in that link, total life expectancy, male life expectancy and death rates for both sexes all hovered near the worst levels. Nor is so-called healthy life expectancy anything to write home about (in 2002, it stood at 53 years and 64 years for men and women respectively, compared with 55/64 for Ukraine, 63/68 in Poland and 67/71 in the US).

Russia's infant mortality rate, at 10.8 / 1000 people in 2008, is respectable compared to countries of roughly similar income levels (Mexico - 19.0; Latvia - 9.0; Poland - 6.9) and far better than most developing countries. Nor is Russia's female life expectancy all that bad compared with the typical Asian or Latin American country. The same cannot be said of male life expectancy. According to CIA estimates, in 2008 it stands at a meagre 59.2 years - the US (75.3), Poland (71.4), India (66.9), Ukraine (62.2) and even Bangladesh (63.2) score higher, while Russia's neighbors in this area are the likes of Madagascar (60.6) and Ghana (58.7). The main reason is amazingly high mortality rates for middle-aged Russian men, which by Rosstat calculations are somewhat higher today than they were in 1897.


Age specific mortality rates / 1000
Left: men; right: women.

As you can see from the graph above, by far the biggest change between 1897 and 2005 occured in a massive reduction in infant mortality, from 233 / 1000 to just 12.5, as well as in children and teens. This was in large part due to basic and fairly cheap to implement advances in vaccinations and basic obstetrics (the latter of which has practically eliminated maternal mortality as a major cause of death amongst women). Female mortality has improved all around, although not to the same extent as in European countries. Yet male mortality has remained stagnant, comparable to old Tsarist and modern African levels.

This is best illustrated by a measure called "Probability of dying (per 1 000 population) between 15 and 60 years". For Russian women in 2005, this was 17% - not much worse than, say, Egypt. Yet almost half of Russian men, at 47%, died before reaching retirement age. This compared with 9% in Japan, 14% in Finland and the US, 16% in China, 21% in Poland, 28-33% in the Baltic countries and 40% in the Ukraine. In fact, it was worse than in many African countries, e.g. Ghana (36%) and Ethiopia (41%). The only states to have the dubious distinction of beating Russia in this sphere were those with mass AIDS epidemics, like South Africa (60%) and Botswana (76%).

Eberstadt's Russia: Too Sick to Matter? is as relevant to mortality today as when it was written in 1999. To quote it in extenso:

For every subsidiary age group from 15 to 65, death rates for Russian men today are frighteningly high. Youth may be the prime of life — but Russian men in their late teens and early 20s currently suffer higher death rates than American men 20 years their senior.13 For their part, Russian men in their 40s and 50s are dying at a pace that may never have been witnessed during peacetime in a society distinguished by urbanization and mass education. Death rates for men in their late 40s and early 50s, for example, are over three times higher today in Russia than in Mexico. To approximate the current mortality schedule for Russian middle-aged men, one has to look to India — the India, that is, of the early 1970s, rather than the much healthier India that we know today.14
It is beyond doubt that Russia's healthcare system has improved in the last one hundred years, and despite its flaws, it is light-years ahead of countries like Ethipia or India, as measured by infant mortality rates, health spending per capita or immunization rates. So how come mortality, especially amongst middle-aged men, is so astoundingly high? To answer the question, it is instructive to look at the historical trends.

Russia life expectancy 1890-2000
Note how overall improvements in life expectancy for men were exclusively
due to the removal of childhood illnesses as a major cause of death.

In 1897, life expectancy in the Russian Empire was extremely low (31 years for males, 33 for females), lagging behind Western Europe and the US by around 15 years. The 1920's and the period from 1945 to 1965 saw the introduction of mass elementary healthcare, raising life expectancy to 64 years for men and 72 years for women. Since then, the latter has stagnated while the latter went into slow but steady decline, in constrast to First World nations where life expectancy continued rising (see graphs below).


Life expectancy in Russia and other countries 1950-2000
Note how Russia trailed Japan up until 1965.

From the first graph on my Demographics I post, we can see that from the mid-1960's mortality in Russia embarked on its merciless upwards trajectory (thus reflecting life expectancy trends). Notice how despite the dips (late 1980's, late 1990's, 2007?) and troughs (early 1990's, early 2000's), it follows a remarkably straight line. Rapid improvements, in which Russia followed Japan's trajectory, stalled in the mid 1960's and have been in stagnation ever since. (The Soviet Slavic and Baltic states followed a similar pattern, e.g. see stats and discussion on Ukrainian historical mortality here).

As of 2006, the vast majority of Russians died from cardio-vascular diseases (CVD's) and injuries/violence. Some 8.6 / 1000 Russians passed away due to CVD's, which is more than the America's entire death rate (8.3 / 1000). In contrast, 2.8 / 1000 of Americans died from CVD's. Russia's deaths from external causes (DEC's) were 2.0 / 1000, about four times higher than in the US. Of these, 23 / 100,000 were from alcohol poisoning, 30 / 100,000 from suicide and 20 / 100,000 from murder. On the other hand, cancers did not kill a significantly higher amount of people than in the West, while deaths from infectitious diseases are quantitavely insignificant. So it is clear than any solution of the mortality crisis will have to focus on reducing deaths from CVD's and injuries / violence.

Historically, it can be seen below that deaths from diseases of the circulatory system have almost doubled since 1970. Forty years ago about an equal percentage of people died from circulatory diseases in both Russia and Europe (although even then, we should point out that this was not a good indicator, since Russians were substantially younger than Europeans then); today, they are separated by a factor of 4, as can be seen in the graph below. Deaths from injuries / violence have followed roughly similar trends.


1970-80 linear projection is mine by Rosstat data

Finally, life expectancy and mortality rates vary by geographical region and socio-economic factors. Siberia, the Far East and the North fare worse in relation to the Volga and the South - in particular, regions like Daghestan and Ingushetia with burgeoning populations of young Muslims were completely immune to the soaring post-1965 mortality rates in Russia proper. In Russia proper, the poor report worse health than the rich (see p.68) and rising mortality has mostly affected those who are poorly-educated ('The well-documented mortality increases seen in Russia after 1990 have predominantly affected less-educated men and women, whereas the mortality of persons with university education has improved, resulting in a sharp increase in educational-level mortality differentials').

Having outlined the situation, we can now ask ourselves several questions.

Why have Russia's mortality rates, especially amongst less well-educated ethnic Russian men, soared since 1965 in such stark contrast to trends in the First World?

Веселие Руси есть пити [The joy of Russia is to drink]. - attr. Vladimir the Great, 988 AD, upon rejecting Islam as Russia's future religion.
At its core, the mortality crisis is an alcohol crisis. Russia has had a long and rich relationship with alcohol from the times of Kievan Rus. From the earliest days excessive drinking was remarked upon in foreign travellers' accounts. Ownership or regulation of vodka production has been a major source of state revenue since Ivan IV created a chain of taverns in all major cities through to the USSR, when in the 1970's receipts from alcohol constituted a third of government revenue. Furthermore, Russian drinking is characterized by the zapoi, long binge sessions involving hard spirits. Nonetheless, until the country became industrialized, excessive regular drinking was circumscribed both by limited incomes (in the 17th century, a keg (12 liters) of bread wine was estimated to cost as much as one and a half or two cows) as well as traditionalist mores and folk wisdom.

Perhaps it was the beginning of the breakdown in social morale that had become endemic by the 1980's. Perhaps it was linked to a tipping point in the level of development (half of Russians were living in cities by the 1950's). Perhaps it was the after-effects of Red Army soldiers who had been given daily 100ml vodka rations during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), became alcoholics and started dying in ever increasing numbers 20 years later. In any case, mortality rates began to increase dramatically since 1965, reaching epidemic proportions by the 1980's. To quote Alcohol in Russia by Martin McKee in extenso:

Potentially more reliable figures have been generated outside the USSR by, for example, surveys of emigrants, especially to Israel, although these are problematic as there is evidence that Soviet Jews drank rather less than their Slavic neighbours. Nonetheless, one of the most rigorous studies, although again likely to be an underestimate because it did not include that large volume of alcohol now known to be stolen each year, suggests that consumption more than doubled between 1955 and 1979 to 15.2 litres per person (Treml, 1975). This figure is higher than that recorded for any OECD country (France was highest at 12.7 litres in 1990, although most other countries were in the range 5–9 litres), where data are largely derived from validated surveys of consumption (World Drink Trends, 1992). Also note that Russians tend to binge on hard spirits, while the French consume red wine in frequent moderate doses. Of course, this figure relates to the entire USSR and, for religious and other reasons, there are marked regional variations so levels in the Russian heartland are likely to have been much higher. Other studies of emigré families suggested that alcohol consumption accounted for 15–20% of disposable household incomes. Studies by dissidents and others supported the impression that alcohol consumption was increasing at alarming levels, suggesting, for example, that alcohol accounted for 15% of total retail trade (Krasikov, 1981).

Under Gorbachev, official statistics on a wide variety of topics slowly reappeared, although it was still not possible to undertake or publish research on topics such as alcoholism and social breakdown (Korolenko et al., 1994). The available data included figures on official production of absolute alcohol equivalent which was reported to have increased from 2.2 litres per capita in 1940 to 7.2 in 1985, a rather greater increase than had been assumed in the earlier estimates by Western observers.

However, the level of consumption is only one part of the picture. It is also important to know whether the frequency of drinking and the social context within which it takes place are different from those in other countries. Here, the information is even more fragmentary. Various reports suggest that, by the 1980s, the age at which people began to drink had fallen, that increasing numbers of women and children were heavy drinkers, and in some cities the average consumption among working adults was a bottle of vodka each day (White, 1996).

This pattern is reflected in the extensive evidence, reviewed by White (1996), from newspapers and from local surveys that alcohol consumption was becoming a major social problem. This included reports from a chemical plant that 3.5% of the workforce were confirmed alcoholics, 2.2% showed early signs of addiction, and a further 18.8% were alcohol ‘abusers’, with only 1.4% abstainers. Between 75% and 90% of absences from work were attributed to alcohol. It was suggested that loss of productivity associated with alcohol was the main reason for the failure to achieve the Soviet Union's 5-year plan in the early 1980s, with estimates that the loss of productiv-ity due to alcohol was up to 20%. There were many letters to newspapers complaining of a lack of government action to tackle excessive consumption.
Refer to the male life expectancy chart above. Notice the slight uptick around 1982, and the much larger improvement from 1985-89? It is not a coincidence. In 1982 'action was initiated under Andropov and Chernenko under the general heading of reducing anti-social behaviour', and three years later a wide range of specific action against alcohol abuse was undertaken - the banning of drinking at workplaces, banning sales before 2pm and in trains and restricting sales to off-licenses and over 21's. Vodka production was cut and alcohol was banned at official functions (interestingly enough, today, there is noise but no action). Alas, initial successes were undermined by black market moonshine (read: more dangerous) production, while the new climate of perestroika decreased the risks of minor lawbreaking. The project was abandoned in 1988. From 1990 to 1994, the price of alcohol in relation to food fell by a factor of more than 3.
Predictably enough, alcohol consumption soared. Life expectancy plummeted.


Alcohol consumption estimates in litres per year
Look at the mortality trends of the first graph here and notice the remarkable
correlation between alcohol consumption and mortality rates.

Furthermore, we noted in this post that mortality rates were 1) geographically not uniform (lowest in the South and Volga) and were worst amongst 2) less well-educated 3) men. Guess what?

Nine per cent of men and 35% of women reported not drinking alcohol at all. Only 10% of men and 2% of women reported drinking several times per week, but 31% of men and 3% of women would drink at least 25 cl of vodka at one go at least once a month, and 3) 11% of men and 1% of women would drink at least 50 cl of vodka in one session at least once per month. There were large geographical differences, 1) with lowest rates of heavy drinking in the Volga and Caucasus regions and highest in the Urals....Unemployment was strongly associated with heavy drinking.

According to a NOBUS survey in 2003 (see pg.68), more than 50% amongst the poorest quintile of Russians consumed hard alcohol daily, compared with little more than 10% of the richest quintile. Since the poor tend to be less well educated, that's 2) met.

Since 2002, alcohol consumption has remained extremely high. In 2006, it was an 'estimated 15.2 litres of pure alcohol per capita each year for over-15s' (no difference from 2002). Another study found that 44% of male deaths and 20% of female deaths can be attributed to alcohol in those aged 25 to 54, including 72% of homicides, 42% of suicides and 23% of CVD's - in total, 32% of aggregate mortality, compared with 1-4% in all sampled West European countries. Even in Finland, well known as a nation of hard drinkers, the figure was just 4%.

On the other hand, there have been some positive developments, especially since 2005. The mortality rate fell from 16.1 / 1000 to 14.7 / 1000 by 2007. Death rates from CVD's fell from 9.1%% to 8.3%% and death from external caused tumbled from 2.2 / 1000 to 1.8 / 1000. Perhaps most crucially, deaths from alcohol poisonings halved, while homicides fell by 30%.

What could have accounted for this? Recent times have seen a rise in national morale, documented here. Burgeoning economic growth has seen real incomes nearly triple in the last eight years and the poverty rate halved. The population, or at least its more connected members, has become more exposed to information on healthy lifestyles. During Putin's second term, there have been more social investments, like the National Priority Projects (one of which is health), and this trend looks set to intensify under Medvedev. Finally, as we've noticed here, younger people are turning to beer - 'beer consumption has risen from 20 litres per person a year to nearly 80 litres'. Considering that total alcohol consumption under Putin has remained about constant, this means that vodka's 70% share of Russia's alcohol consumption in 2001 must have fallen since.

In conclusion, it's safe to say that alcohol is by far the biggest contributor to Russia's mortality crisis. On the other hand, Russia, and more particularly working Russian men, pursue lifestyles that are practically optimized for ending them. In 2004, 61% of Russian men (and 15% of women) smoked - one of the highest rates in the world and little changed from Soviet times. (Mass smoking began during and immediately after the Second World War, while mortality began to rise 20 years later). Men smoked an average of 16 cigarettes per day. The Russian diet is 'characterized by a diet high in animal fat and salt, and low in fruits and vegetables' and many Russians suffer from high blood pressure and excessive blood cholesterol levels. I have covered the extreme importance of this factor in my post You Live How You Eat. Most Russians lead a sedentary lifestyle - 'from 2000 to 2002, 73-81% of surveyed men and 73-86% of women aged 25-64 reported having low-levels of physical activity (CINDI 2004)'. Finally, the healthcare system suffers from a legacy of underfunding (real public health expenditure only overtook late Soviet figures in 2007) and inefficiency.

The general population is aware of the problems. Putin is not too impressed either, as he made clear in his state of the nation address in 2005.

I am deeply convinced that the success of our policy in all spheres of life is closely linked to the solution of our most acute demographic problems. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the fact that the life expectancy of Russian women is nearly 10 years and of men nearly 16 years shorter than in Western Europe. Many of the current mortality factors can be remedied, and without particular expense. In Russia nearly 100 people a day die in road accidents. The reasons are well known. And we should implement a whole range of measures to overcome this dreadful situation.

I would like to dwell on another subject which is difficult for our society - the consequences of alcoholism and drug addiction. Every year in Russia, about 40,000 people die from alcohol poisoning alone, caused first of all by alcohol substitutes. Mainly they are young men, breadwinners. However, this problem cannot be resolved through prohibition. Our work must result in the young generation recognizing the need for a healthy lifestyle and physical exercise. Each young person
must realize that a healthy lifestyle means success, his or her personal success.
Which is why the state has set itself the task of stopping negative natural population growth by 2011 and raising life expectancy to 75 by 2020. The billion dollar question is: will they succeed?

How and to what extent can Russia solve its mortality crisis?

The pessimistic demographers are skeptical of Russia's ability to solve the mortality crisis any time soon. For instance, according to Eberstadt, achieving rapid improvements in mortality from CVD's is unrealistic:

With heart disease, in a real sense, today’s "bills" cover "debts" accumulated over long periods in the past. For this reason, trends in deaths from heart disease in any country can never turn on a dime. Even with sensible, well-funded medical policies and wholesale popular embrace of a more "heart-healthy" lifestyle — none of which conditions obtain in today’s Russia — the control and reduction of CVD death rates tends to be a relatively gradual affair.
Furthermore, Russia suffers from 'negative mometum' in mortality. Working age life expectancy has been decreasing for forty years straight. In a sense, young Russians today are much 'older' than their peers of the same age a generation ago. Two assumptions are made. Firstly, as today's young people are less healthy than their equivalents forty years back (who are now dying at already very high rates), this implies that when they reach their forties, fifties and sixties, their mortality will be even higher. Secondly, the population continues to get older, as the post-war boomers reach pension age. This creates the conditions for a demographic double wammy that, everything else remaining equal, will further depress life expectancy and massively inflate mortality levels even further. An example of these simplistic trend extrapolation can be seen in this model, according to which male life expectancy will fall to as low as 49 years by 2050. This is what we'd call a Stagnation scenario.

If this 'debt model' of national health is correct, and if societal attitudes remain stuck in the past, then Russia should indeed reconcile itself to continuing increases in the death rate and accelerating population decline. Fortunately, there is evidence that the first of the above assumptions is flawed.


Generational mortality for men 1981-2006
Indicates mortality levels for each age group for a given year. Lowest line
correspondsto the 40-44 age group, second lowest to the 45-49 age group in 2006, etc.
Colors track out a particular generation's demographic history,
e.g. pink is the generation who were 60-64 years old as of 2006.

Take a look the above graph. Firstly, notice how mortality amongst all age groups rise and fall with each other. This implies that that in Russia, the factors leading to high mortality affect all age groups about equally. (If it hadn't - if for example heavy drinking had only been increasing in the younger generations - then the lines above would have overlapped, or at least gotten closer together, as the younger generations started dying more relatively to the older). This puts into question Eberstadt's whole ticking time-bomb thesis.

But more importantly, notice how mortality amongst all age groups declined from 2001 to 2006. Let us also note that this period came before the health National Priority Project. Nor did alcohol consumption decline, as we noted (although young people started drinking more beer - but we're talking about middle-aged people here, and the fall in mortality amongst those in their sixties was if anything greater than in other age groups). There was a small drop in cigarette smoking rates, but benefits from that come with at least a few years' lag. Yet a tipping point seems to have come at around 2005. Remember the 47% male "probability of dying" rates from 15-60 years in 2005? Well, according to Rosstat, in 2006 they fell to 43%, and fell further in 2007 (judging from the fact male life expectancy increased from 58.9 in 2005 to 60.4 in 2006 and 61.5 in 2007).

There is, however, a factor which explains flunctuations in Russia's life expectancy much better than any other theory. That is the ratio of alcohol to food prices, as shown below. Notice how all price spikes and dips were associated with troughts and crests in life expectancy, especially pronounced amongst men.


Alcohol / food price ratios and life expectancy

Which takes us to the next part of the discussion. What is the government doing to promote healthy lifestyles, and what should it do?

For that, it is sufficient to look at a typical issue of the bi-weekly Russian demographic journal Demoscope Russia section - plans to raise pensions from 30-35% to 60-65% of wages, general increase in welfare, raising the alcohol-buying age to 21 and banning alcohol and tobacco adverts on transport. Increasing numbers of patients are getting access to hi-tech medical care. Even La Russophobe noticed these efforts, which must mean Russia is doing something right. In other words, all the things done in the West since the 1970's and which the USSR tried to do in the 1980's but gave up on.

In 1990, "probability of dying" rates for Russian and Estonian men were similar (32% and 30%, respectively), and both soared by 1995 (47% and 40%, respectively). In the next ten years, however, Estonia's figure plumetted to 28%, while Russia in 2005 remained at 47%, falling only slightly in the interval. As we've noted, however, by 2007 this figure was probably already below 40%. Contrary to Eberstadt's protestations to the contrary, rapid improvements in mortality stats are possible, and at no great expense if the 'population-based and high-risk prevention strategies' recommended here are pursued. The example of Karelia in Finland is illustrative:

The North Karelia Project in Finland shows that major changes in mortality from NCDs can be achieved through dietary changes, increased physical activity, and reduced smoking, serum cholesterol, and blood pressure. Coronary heart disease(CHD) in adults aged 65 years and less fell by about 73 percent between 1970 and 1995. In a recent 10-year period, mortality from coronary heart disease declined by about 8 percent a year. Mortality from lung cancer declined more than 70 percent, mostly due to consistent declines in the proportion of men who smoked (from 52 percent in 1972 to 31 percent in 1997). Data on the risk factors from ischemic heart disease and mortality in Finland suggest that the changes in the main coronary risk factors (serum cholesterol concentration, blood pressure, and smoking) can explain most of the decline in mortality from that disease.

As a result of targeting important high-risk factors for NCDs, all causes of mortality in North Karelia declined by about 45 percent during 1970–95. In the 1980s, these favorable changes began to develop all over Finland, improving life expectancy by 7 years for men and 6 for women. The largest decline in age-specific mortality was reaped by the 35- to 44-year-olds: men in this age group saw an 87 percent decline in mortality from CHD between 1971 and 1995. Men 35–64 saw age-adjusted mortality rates decline from about 700 per 100,000 populationin 1971 to about 110 per 100,000 in 2001. This rate for all of Finland among men in the same age group was about 470 per 100,000 and fell 75 percent. These improvements in life expectancy are correlated with significant declines in the amount of saturated fats consumed, coming mainly from milk products and fatty meat (saturated fatconsumption dropped from about 50 gr/day in 1972 to about 15 gr/day in 1992) and significant reductions in blood cholesterol levels (from about 7mmol/L in 1972 to about 5.6 mmol/L in 1997).

...Data from North Karelia reveal that results from preventionefforts may appear in years rather thandecade—improvements occur some 2-7 years after the elimination of the exposure to a risk factor, and that they are beneficial even for people in older age groups.

This suggests that if the trends explained above continue and people continue jumping up income classes, health improvements are sustainable. There's a handy chart below showing the effects of decreasing different types of mortality on life expectancy.


Even if the only Improvements were a 40% drop in deaths from circulatory diseases and external causes, average life expectancy in Russia would rise to a respectable 72 years (in line with what happened in Estonia, where life expectancy grew from 67.8 years in 1995 to 73.0 years in 2005). On the one hand, Karelia was just one region; on the other, today's medical technology is much more advanced than even a decade ago. As such, I think the idea of raising life expectancy to 75 years by 2020 is fulfillable, and that is not even taking into account the emerging technologies of life extension - which should be zealously pursued for both its financial (acturial escape velocity) and more tangible everyday benefits (like being able to live as long as you want).

Talking of which, we now move on to the fun bit - the Transformation scenario. This is an event or series of events which would induce a demographic paradigm shift. In the previous post, we've identified the artificial womb as a revolutionary concept for supply-side demographics, which will make the 'birth rate' independent of sociological factors. What would be revolutionary for the demographic depreciation rate (death rates)? Continuous and exponential growth in life expectancy. How could that be achieved?

Well, to an extent that is the case already.


Life Expectancy in England & Wales, both sexes, 1541-1998
Life expectancy at birth of male landowners in England between 1200 and 1450 AD,
so not strictly comparable with later, more detailed stats.

As you can see, from a historical perspective life expectancy before the Industrial Revolution was essentially stagnant. There were macro-trends associated with pressure on the earth's carrying capacity, which drove down life expectancy in the 1200's and 1550-1750, as well as sudden dips due to chaotic factors (the Black Death in the middle of the 14th century, flunctuations from 1500-1800 due to random climate changes impacting on food production), but on the whole it stayed flat. However, around 1750, there was a turning point, coinciding in time with the Agricultural Revolution. The 19th century saw considerable improvement, while in the 20th century it shot upwards.

Granted, the 1900-1960 growth spurt was mainly due to massive reductions in infant mortality rather than adult longevity increases per se. On the other hand, the former stopped playing a substantial role by 1960, and improvements in life expectancy occured mainly through the lowering of adult mortality rates. Since then, the sum of Western lifestyle and healthcare changes decreased adult mortality and pushed life expectancy up. (In the USSR, as we've noticed, healthcare remained stagnant and lifestyles worsened, so life expectancy sloped down).

However, now Russia has rejoined the mainstream of world development and as we've pointed out here and here, rapid economic convergence with the First World is likely. In the latter, life expectancy has been rising by around 0.3% per annum since 1970. Serious interest and research is already under way, such as the Methuselah Mouse Prize and Aubrey de Grey's work on strategies for engineered negligible senescence (SENS).
The seven sisters that Dr de Grey wishes to slaughter with SENS are cell loss, apoptosis-resistance (the tendency of cells to refuse to die when they are supposed to), gene mutations in the cell nucleus, gene mutations in the mitochondria (the cell's power-packs), the accumulation of junk inside cells, the accumulation of junk outside cells and the accumulation of inappropriate chemical links in the material that supports cells.
For more information, read the above Economist article, the wiki entry and a related collection of articles. Unfortunately, however, these technologies are not going to be making a truly revolutionary impact demographically any sooner than in about three decades (10 years to perfect them in animal experiments; another 10 to conduct the necessary human experiments; the final 10 to bring them into mass usage).

Nonetheless, the potential already exists today to radically prolong life expectancy.

As I've said, Russian men are unique in the kinds of destructive lifestyle they pursue - binge vodka drinking, chain smoking, sedentary lifestyles and a high-fat, high-sodium diet. The government is belatedly taking measures aimed against the first two above, helped along by a booming economy. On the other hand, there's no concerted government action to combat the latter two (like in every other country). If that could be remedied, then Russia could acquire the world's highest life expectancy.

According to research that is explained in the book The 10% Solution For A Healthy Life, reducing caloric intake derived from fats to 10% and cutting on cholesterol, sodium and sugar will not only virtually eliminate heart disease, it will also tremendously lower the chance of other diseases including cancer, strokes, hypertension and type 2 diabetes. All in all, if every American followed such advice, mortality rates could be cut by more than 40%. (At least initially - eventually, all things remaining equal, they'll die of other causes. But then again, all mortality demographics is about postponing rather than cancelling the day of reckoning. In the big picture, even if we all become immortal, there's still heat death to worry about).

The gains for Russia will be even larger. Not only do Russians have a unique combination of undesirable lifestyle traits - widespread alcohol, tobacco and narcotics consumption, stress, little exercise and bad diet, even the diet itself is close to being optimally bad, characterized as it is by high fat (coating the saucepan with huge dollops of vegetable oil, smearing pel'meni with smetana, salo, etc), high sodium (lots of pickles, salted fish, etc) and high cholesterol (eggs yellows).

Basically we need to undertake the measures I've recommended in my post You Live How You Eat. I'll quote them:
  • Launch a wide-scale public information campaign to cut down on fat consumption. By wide-scale, I mean prime-time adverts on all the major state TV channels, newspapers and the Internet.
  • Encourage people to consume poutry and fish instead of red meat, eggs and milk. Discourage any usage of salt, sugar, butter, sunflower oil. Give preference to boiling or steaming over grilling (which increases rates of stomach cancers).
  • Ban all alcohol, fat and other narcotics advertising.
  • Make the 'encouragement' real by taxing fat content in foods. It is addictive, mood-changing and deleterious to health, and as such is qualitatively no different from alcohol (or ecstasy or shrooms, for that matter). Use this money to fund healthcare or subsidize fruit production. (I am aware that this is all really not market-friendly, but in this particular case the market has failed - the lifestyle choices people make rarely serve to maximize their utility function, especially in Russia).
  • Similarly, tax salt, sugar and cholestorol content in food. I am continuously surprised and upset at the staggeringly high amounts of salt or sugar present even in apparently innocuous foods like bread or cereals.
  • Russia, like the West, has an obesity epidemic. In my view the recent trend towards treating it as 'normal' is unwelcome. While I certainly don't want to imply that obese people should be denigrated, society should recognize it for the debilitating disease it is and offer far more support and incentives for them to overcome it. The UK has some interesting ideas.
  • Convert wine production into a strategic industry and massively fund its expansion. Try to remake Russia into a wine-drinking nation. Aim to turn vodka into an exclusively export industry.
  • Impose high taxes on McDonalds, KFC and other fast-food outlets. Impose high taxes on soft drinks and crisps like one would on any narcotic.
I've since written more on the Necessity of a Fat Tax.

So that's the plan for Transformation. Improvements in lowering rates of mortality attributable to alcohol to decent levels will reduce them by maybe 25%. Lowering tobacco usage to normal Western levels of 20-25% and environmental measures could reduce it by another 10%, while better healthcare could account for another 20%. This would lower Russia's mortality rate from 14.7 / 100,000 to 8.9 / 100,000, which is comparable to the US (a country whose median age is about the same as Russia's). Finally, implementing the Fat Tax and encouraging sport and leisure could cut that figure by as much as 25% (theoretically, by 50%, but obviously not everyone will adopt the 10% Solution), bringing the mortality rate down to just 7.1 / 100,000.

The Myth of Economic Collapse due to Ageing Population

According to a Stagnation (extrapolation of today's fertility and age-specific mortality trends, which sees Russia's population falling by 12% to 2025), the proportion of population aged 65+ will increase from 12% to 18% - but the latter figure is actually equal to Estonia's percentage today, whose main problems today are purely macroeconomic (big CA deficit) rather than entitlements. The World Bank's 15th Russian Economy Report itself admits this:
But growing older does not have to mean growing slower. Aging is not a stop sign for growth - if Russia enacts policy reforms that sustain productivity growth. Changes in labor markets are not immutably determined by demographic legacies. Productivity improvements are the core predictor of growth, so measures to improve labor productivity would swamp any "quantity" effects of a smaller labor force. In fact, in recent years, growth decomposition exercises show that in Russia labor productivity growth has been the single greatest contributor to increases in per capita income.
Considering that the gap between (high) human capital and (low) GDP per capita is so great in Russia, productivity growth should continue to be buoyant for the foreseeable future - as we've concluded in the article on Education as the Elixir of Growth. Furthermore, considering that in the future older Russians will be both healthier and more educated, an ageing workforce could be counteracted by increased labor participation of the older cohorts in the economy.

Is Russia facing an AIDS Catastrophe?

According to Eberstadt's 'Intermediate Epidemic' scenario in The Future of AIDS, there will be a cumulative total of 13mn AIDS cases in Russia by 2025, 9mn would have died and life expectancy will be down to just 63 years. Other media have also homed in on the apocalyptic dimensions of Russia's AIDS crisis.

According to government figures, the number of new cases peaked in 2001 at 87,000, but has since stabilized at around 40,000-50,000 per year from 2003 on. As of 2007, there were 402,000 cumulative AIDS cases. However, although Russia's AIDS epidemic was at first concentrated amongst injecting drug users (IDU's), 'HIV-infection is starting to spread more intensively heterosexually'. The share of women diagnosed with HIV every year increased from 20% in 2001, to 38% in 2004 and 44% in 2006. However, other assessments of the share of Russia's HIV prevalence are usually about three times higher than official figures. HIV prevalence among pregnant women in Russia was 0.3% in 2004 and 0.4% in 2005 and 2006.

But there are good points too. Since 2006, the federal government has started spending huge amounts on the problem. Syphilis and hepatitis B have fallen sharply from their respective 1997 and 1999 peaks. The incidence of tuberculosis peaked in 2001 at around 95 / 100,000, although the fall hasn't been as dramatic (82 / 100,000 in 2007). According to official sources, AIDS monitoring coverage in Russia consists of 20% of the population, including all the high-risk groups, so perhaps official figures aren't such big underestimates after all.

The reality is that I simply don't know enough about this to make a judgement either way, but then again, it is not even known why AIDS exploded in sub-Saharan Africa but remained contained everywhere else. If readers can point to more concrete information on this topic (AIDS in Russia) it would be much appreciated.

Now for Demographics III - Face of the Future... (five projections for future demographics - birth rates, death rates and population size for five scenarios: Stagnation, Low Improvements, Medium Improvements, High Improvements, Transformation).

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

Editorial: Demographics I - The Russian Cross Reversed?

The demographic situation in Russia is usually painted in apocalyptic terms. The Russian Cross - the post-Soviet transition into a world of death without new life - will supposedly preclude it from attaining First World living standards and wreck any Great Power, let alone superpower, pretensions. Is Russia Too Sick to Matter and the Sick Man of Europe, as alleged by Nicholas Eberstadt in two reports in 1999 and 2004, respectively? Are we seeing the Death of a Nation?

To answer these questions, we'll look at the statistics and trends, and extrapolate into the future under three different scenarios - 1. Stagnation, 2. Improvement and 3. Transformation. In the end we conclude that while the demographic, or rather the mortality, problem is indeed serious, it need not entail pessimism if appropriate measures are taken. Nor will it have anything but a negligible effect on the economy.

First, let us look at the historical trends. Below, I have collated the birth and death rate for Russia from 1959-2008 using data from The Human Mortality Database, Soviet Economic Statistical Series and Rosstat. Subtracting the death rate from the birth rate gives the rate of natural increase.

The rate of natural increase would have closely correlated with overall population growth in Soviet times, since migration either way was small then. The same cannot be said of the 1990's, though, when there was a large-scale influx of ethnic Russians from the newly independent Near Abroad. While throughout much of the period the rate of natural increase was below -0.5% annually, the population decreased at a much lower rate - indeed, serious decline manifested itself only from around 2000, by which time the flow of migrants had slowed down).




As you can see, the birth rate experienced two transitions - in the early 1960's and early 1990's. The fertility rate fell from 2.6 children per woman in 1960 to replacement level (2.1) by the late 1960's, where it hovered until 1990.




In the 1990's, it dropped precipitously, to 1.34 in 1995 and reaching a trough of 1.17 in 1999. Since then, there has been a slow recovery up to 1.30 in 2006 and rapid spurt recently. In fact, as contributor Oleg pointed out, this is getting noticed in the Western media - Russia Has First Post-Soviet Baby Boom. A booming economy, state sponsored pro-natality propaganda campaign and a 2007 law that 'expanded maternity leave benefits and payments, and granted mothers educational and other vouchers worth $10,650 for a second child and any thereafter', contributed to the fertility rate rising to 1.39 in 2007 and more than 1.50 this year. This is more than the average for the European Union and approaching the United Kingdom.

Is this a sustainable trend? Nicholas Eberstadt doesn't think so.



The other side of the equation is the fertility level, and Russian fertility is very low these days, although it has crept up over the past five or six years. But it is still down 30-40 percent below the replacement level. Is it feasible to think that Russian fertility will rise to replacement level over the next decade or so? Well if Russian fertility does rise up to replacement level, if it does rise by 50 percent from its current levels, this would be because of change in desired fertility on the part of parents in the Russian Federation. So far I don't think we've seen any big signs of a big demand for more children. Rather, what we seem to be observing is that Russia is becoming part of the rest of Europe with respect to ideas about ideal family size. In the rest of Europe, fertility levels are very far below the replacement level. There are a few exceptions like France's, which are close to replacement levels, but for the most part, European norms on fertility are one or at most two children as the ideal family size. What drives births in modern, relatively affluent societies, more than any other factor, are parental desires about how many children to have. Unless there is a transformation of Russian attitudes about children, its going to be hard for any kind of program of birth incentives or birth schemes to convince Russian parents to have more children then they see as the ideal.
This is an assumption backed up by the raw data - the chart below shows historic fertility rates from an international perspective, in which Russia appears to plummet into and beneath mainstream European levels since the late 1980's.



On the other hand, a 2005 Rosstat study, Family and Fertility, challenges Eberstadt's assumptions about desired fertility in Russia. The average desired amount of children, within favorable economic and social conditions, was 2.24, 2.40 and 1.99 for women, men and 15-17 year old teenagers respectively in Tver oblast, 2.26, 2.63 and 2.15 in Nizhnij Novgorod and 2.33, 2.56 and 2.11 in Marij El. On the other hand, the amount of children people are prepared to have in the present circumstances is substantially lower. Amongst women, men and teenagers, it is: 1.75, 1.87 and 1.72 in Tver Oblast; 1.60, 1.78 and 1.97 in Nizhnij Novgorod; 1.83, 2.05 and 1.92 in Marij El. According to Rosstat, the birth rate in these regions in 2005 was 9.3, 8.9 and 10.5 / 1000 people respectively, which is similar to the Russian average of 10.2 As such, it's possible to construct the following table. Italics are estimates based on linear extrapolation from other data in the table.



Russian D